Do We Have Free Will? An Inquiry into Digital Compulsion and the Autonomy of the User

January 31, 2026

An essay for the Philosophy of Mind module at Imperial! It grew out of a very personal place: a genuine frustration with my own phone addiction and the philosophical contradiction I found myself living in. On one hand, I held a reductionist view that mental states are just neural states. On the other, I desperately invoked some Cartesian "self" that could rise above its biology and exert willpower.

Working through the mind-body problem forced me to confront that contradiction. The essay traces a path from Substance Dualism and Eliminative Materialism through Compatibilism, landing on Donald Davidson's non-reductive physicalism as the most honest account of what it actually feels like to struggle with a compulsion. The key insight: for an action to be mine, it must be caused by who I am, not despite who I am. A "causeless" act is not freedom, it is a glitch.

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